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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of #2-2/11/83 
WYANDANCH UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-5818 
WYANDANCH TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION. 
NYEA/NEA. 
Charging Party. 
PACHMAN. OSHRIN & BLOCK. P.C. (ALAN D. OSHRIN. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
FRANK SAYERS. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Wyandanch Union Free School District (District) to a hearing 
officer's decision that it violated its duty to negotiate in 
good faith with the Wyandanch Teachers' Association. 
NYEA/NEA (Association) by unilaterally increasing the 
teaching time of the employees who teach in its middle 
school and who are represented by the Association. 
Board - U-5818 -2 
The record establishes that the school day of the 
students was increased 25 minutes, several of the periods 
having been increased five minutes each. The teaching time 
of teachers at the middle school was increased 25 minutes 
along with the school day of the• 'students7 butthere was no 
increase in the overall teacher workday or change in their 
other conditions of employment. The Association and the 
District had negotiated a 6 3/4 hour workday for teachers, 
which was retained after the increase in the student day. 
The record does not show, and the Association does not 
claim, that the teachers' working time within that 6 3/4 
hour workday was increased. Their lunch time remained 
unchanged and their preparation periods were actually 
increased by five minutes. 
The hearing officer determined that the increase in 
teaching time constituted an increase in work load and was 
therefore a mandatory subject of negotiation. In reaching 
her conclusion, she relied primarily upon State of New York 
(SUNY) . 14 PERB ir3068 (1981). aff'd AD2d (3d Dept. . 
1982). 15 PERB 1F7031. In that case we found that the State 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it 
unilaterally changed from 12 to 15 the number of weekly 
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classroom teaching periods (student contact hours) of 
certain teachers at Morrisville College. Our reason was 
that for such teachers, the number of teaching periods 
actually determined the extent of their workday.-
We do not find State of New York to be dispositive of 
the issue before us because here the actual length of 
teaching time did not control the extent of the working time 
of the teachers within their total workday. On the 
contrary, the negotiated workday for the teachers was not 
affected by the increase in teaching time. It follows that 
the change did not constitute an improper unilateral 
action.-
i^The State had argued that the increase of teaching 
time did not establish an increase of teacher work load 
because the teachers had nonteaching responsibilities 
including "participation on committees, student advising, 
job placement and community service." This argument implies 
that the increase in teaching time was matched by a decrease 
in the time spent on other duties. We did not find this 
implication to be substantiated, there being no evidence as 
to the amount of time spent by the teachers on these other 
activities either before or after the increased teaching 
load. 
1/see Norwich City School District, 14 PERB ir3059 
(1981). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: February 11, 19 8 3 
Albany, New York 
C^i )U<U*^&<^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I n t h e M a t t e r of //2B-2/11/83 
TOWN OF SANTA CLARA. 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-6076 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 687. 
Charging Party. 
JOHN D. DELEHANTY. ESQ.. for Respondent 
ROCCO A. DE PERNO. ESQ. (GEORGE C. MURAD. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Teamsters 
Local Union No. 687 (Local 687) to a hearing officer's 
decision dismissing its charge that the Town of Santa Clara 
(Town) fired William J. Brown because he took the lead in 
organizing the employees of the Town's highway department. 
The hearing officer found that Brown had taken a lead in 
organizing the Town's highway department on behalf of 
Local 687 and that he was fired shortly thereafter. 
However, the hearing officer concluded that Brown's 
organizing activity was not the reason for his discharge. 
857 
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The record shows that the Town is divided into two 
geographical districts 40 miles apart. The primary-
responsibility of Brown, who resides in District 1, was to 
operate snow removal equipment in District 2. In the past, 
this had been the job of Robert Hickok. now the Town's 
highway superintendent and the Town officer who fired 
Brown. When Hickok resigned from that position in January 
1981, he stated publicly that the snow removal operations in 
District 2 could not be properly performed by someone who 
lived far from the district. Thereafter when he campaigned 
for election as highway superintendent in the Fall of 1981, 
one of his campaign positions was that District 2's snow 
removal equipment operator would be a District 2 resident. 
Brown initiated an organizing effort on behalf of 
Local 687 on December 8. 1981. which was after Hickok's 
election as highway superintendent. The record establishes 
that Hickok knew of Brown's organizational activities and 
that he was hostile to them. Nevertheless, when the Local 
submitted its showing of interest, the Town Board recognized 
it as negotiating representative. The Local presented its 
demands on February 9. 1982. Brown was fired on 
February 26. 1982. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of 
the hearing officer that Hickok decided to fire Brown, not 
because of Brown's organizing activities but because Brown 
Ses 
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did not live in District 2. Accordingly, we cannot find 
that the discharge violated the Taylor Law.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany, New York 
I/see City of Albany v. Helsbv. 29 NY2d 433 (1972). 5 
PERB ir7000, in which the Court said. "[T]he mere coincidence 
of an employee's union activity and the employer's transfer, 
demotion or discharge will [not] support a charge of 
discrimination." 
We do not find it necessary to consider the correctness 
of an alternative basis for the hearing officer's decision, 
i.e.. that Hickok did not act as an agent of the Town when 
he fired Brown. 
859 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #202/11/83 
DUNDEE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5705 
-and-
MARTIN MILLER. 
Charging Party. 
MURRY F. SOLOMON, for Respondent 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Martin 
Miller to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge 
that Dundee Central School District (District) coerced and 
discriminated against him because he engaged in conduct 
protected by the Taylor Law.— His primary complaint is 
that the hearing officer erred in not finding that the 
i/The District filed three exceptions of its own. The 
first is that the hearing officer did not permit it. to 
introduce evidence showing that Miller had committed perjury 
in another matter. The District's second exception 
parallels its first, dealing with the truth of statements 
contained in a letter sent by Miller. The hearing officer 
committed no error in rejecting this evidence as it was not 
relevant to the basis for his decision. The District's 
third exception is to the hearing officer's finding that it 
had evidenced concern, inter alia, about Miller's 
grievances. That finding is supported by the evidence. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the District's exceptions. 
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District acted improperly when it denied him reappointment 
as chairman of the math department. He also argues that the 
hearing officer erred in not finding that the District acted 
improperly when it denied him an opportunity to be 
accompaniedby a fellow employee to ameeting with District 
representatives which was held at his request and at which 
the District was to explain to him why he had not been 
reappointed chairman of the mathematics department. 
Finally, Miller contends that the hearing officer erred in 
not finding that the District acted improperly when on 
August 26, 1981, it placed various documents in his file. 
Miller had been chairman of the math department of the 
District for many years when he was denied reappointment. 
The District has asserted several reasons for its actions, 
all of which are supported by the record. He had filed an 
enormous number of complaints with various officials which, 
the school principal asserts, generated about one hour's 
work a day for him. He also engaged in insubordinate 
conduct and took inappropriate actions with respect to a 
student. 
Among the complaints filed by Miller, there were nine 
grievances. On the record before us, however, we affirm the 
finding of the hearing officer that Miller's nonprotected 
activities were sufficiently distressing to the District so 
that it would not have reappointed him department chairman 
regardless of any concern it may have had about his filing 
^§861 
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of the grievances.— 
We further conclude, as did the hearing officer, that 
the District was not obligated to permit Miller to be 
accompanied at the meeting with the District which he had 
requested and which was held so that the District could 
inform him of its reasons for the action it had already 
3/ . . 
taken.- We also find that the hearing officer gave ample 
attention to Miller's allegation that the District acted 
improperly when it put various documents in Miller's file 
and we affirm his findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding this matter. 
.^/compare Smithtown. 11 PERB 1f3099 (1978). in which we 
said: 
Thus, the record supports the hearing officer's 
conclusion that the decision not to rehire Glasheen. 
made by Germain, was arrived at because he deemed her to 
be a disruptive individual within his department. We 
agree with the hearing officer that the record does not 
establish that, but for her exercise of protected 
rights, Glasheen would still be working for the Town of 
Smithtown. 
and City of Albany. 9 PERB ir3055 (1976). aff'd City of 
Albany V PERB, 57 AD2d 37. 10 PERB 1f7012 (1977). (3d Dept.. 
1977). aff'd 43 NY2d 954. 11 PERB T7007 (1978). 
See also City of Albany. 4 PERB ir3056 (1971). in which 
we held that the evidence did not establish that the 
employees involved would have been promoted but for their 
having engaged in protected activities. 
1/See Tokheim Corp.. 265 NLRB No. 210. 112 LRRM 1057 
(1982). 
•5vbw 
Board - U-5705 -4 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman ""' 
<J?U- /fib*****' 
Ida KLaus^ , Member 
'6Uf^J^ 
David C. Randies. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#2D-2 / l l / 82 
CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL GUILD. LOCAL 3 7 5 . 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-5972 
LEON KATZ, 
Charging Party. 
BEVERLY GROSS. ESQ.. for Respondent 
LEON KATZ. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 21, 1982, a hearing officer determined that the 
Civil Service Technical Guild. Local 375 (Local) violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act by not providing Leon Katz. the 
charging party herein, with adequate financial information 
explaining the amount of the 1980 agency fee refund that it 
made to him. Having found merit to the charge, the hearing 
officer ordered the Local to refund to Katz the entire 
amount of his agency fee deduction for 1980 not forwarded to 
its affiliates,— with interest. She further ordered that 
at the time of making future refunds, the Local should 
furnish, together with those refunds, "an itemized, audited 
i^The charge concerns only the portion of the 1980 
refund provided by the Local, not its affiliates. 
Board - U-5972 
2/ 
statement of its receipts and disbursements."— 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Local. The sole issue raised by the exceptions relates to 
the hearing officer's order that at the time of making 
future refunds the Local must give the person seeking the 
refund a "statement of its receipts and disbursements." The 
Local argues that this Board has no statutory authority to 
require disclosure of receipts. It argues that under the 
provisions of CSL §208.3(b) union receipts are irrelevant to 
the question of the refund amount. It argues that the 
refund calculation requires only determining the proportion 
which political and ideological expenditures are of all 
expenditures, and rebating an amount equal to that 
percentage. It reasons that since the itemization of 
rebatable and nonrebatable expenditures provides all 
relevant information, the inclusion by the hearing officer 
of the requirement of the disclosure of receipts has no 
statutory or record basis. 
^The order adopted by the hearing officer in this 
regard is as follows: 
It is further ordered that at the time of making 
any other and future refunds, it furnish, together 
with those refunds, an itemized, audited statement 
of its receipts and disbursements, and those of any 
of its affiliates receiving any portion of its 
revenues from agency fees, such statement to 
indicate the basis of the determination of the 
amount of refund, including identification of those 
disbursements that are refundable and those that 
are not. 
Board - U-5972 
DISCUSSION 
At the outset we observe that the hearing officer's 
requirement of the disclosure of receipts as well as 
expenditures follows the remedial order which we adopted 
when we first held that a union's failure to furnish an 
objector with detailed financial information at the time of 
refund constituted a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
UUP (Barry). 13 PERB 1P090 (1980). In that case we stated 
that detailed financial information should be furnished "so 
that employees may understand the basis on which their 
refund has been calculated and thus be able to determine 
whether an appeal is warranted and likely to succeed." In 
confirming that decision, the Appellate Division. Third 
Department, stated, in part: "Finally, we conclude that the 
remedy adopted by PERB was proper and well suited to prevent 
future improper practices." UUP v. Newman. 86 AD2d 734. 735 
(1982), lv to app den 56 NY2d 504 (1982). We have since 
that decision Uniformly included in our remedial orders the 
requirement that future refunds be accompanied by an 
"itemized, audited statement of receipts and 
3/ 
expenditures" .— 
•2/see Hampton Bays. 14 PERB IPOIS (1981); East 
Moriches. 14 PERB ir3056 (1981); Westbury. 14 PERB 3063 
(1981); Middle Country. 15 PERB ir3004 (1982); Professional 
Staff Congress. 15 PERB 1P012 (1982); Public Employees 
Federation. 15 PERB 1P024 (1982). 
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We have been empowered "to establish procedures for the 
prevention of improper...employee organization practices... 
and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the 
policies" of the Act. (CSL §205.5(d)). In our view, the 
real question raised by the Local is whether it will 
effectuate the policies of the Act to require an employee 
organization to furnish information concerning its receipts 
as well as its disbursements at the time of refund. We 
conclude that full disclosure of the receipts and 
expenditures of the employee organization provides a 
reasonable method of assisting the objector to understand 
the basis on which the refund has been calculated, thereby 
assuring more complete protection of the underlying rights 
of the public employees involved. This requirement is 
entirely consistent with the limited purposes of the agency 
fee statute and necessary to the proper effectuation of the 
essential policies of the basic Act. 
The Local argues that expenditures are the only 
relevant elements in the calculation of the refund since the 
statute refers only to "expenditures". This misreads the 
statute. CSL §208.3(b) states that the refund shall 
represent "the employee's pro rata share of 
expenditures...of a political or ideological nature...". 
The significant term in this definition, for this purpose, 
are the words "pro rata share". "Pro rata" is defined as 
"proportionately according to some exactly calculable 
Board - U-5972 -5 
factor...".(Websters' Third International Dictionary). The 
statute does not state how that proportion is to be 
calculated. It does not mandate a particular method for 
calculating the refund. The statute, therefore, cannot be 
construed as limiting our remedial orders to a particular 
method of refund calculation. 
The Local argues that expenditures are the only relevant 
elements in the calculation of the "pro rata share" since 
the proportion can only be determined by comparing political 
and ideological expenditures to the total expenditures. 
Whether or not this is so, we know that it is not the method 
which some other unions use. In response to previous 
orders, we have been furnished with financial disclosures 
from other unions which show that the pro rata share is 
determined by them by computing the proportion of their 
political and ideological expenditures to their income. 
There may be still other methods used for calculating the 
refund. 
Of more importance, however, if this Board were to 
accept this contention of the Local, we would, in effect, be 
holding that only one method of calculating the refund is 
proper. We believe that it would exceed our powers so to 
hold. We have previously held that we have not been granted 
the authority either by CSL §208.3(b) or §205.5(d). to 
review the accuracy of the refund determination, i.e., the 
Board - U-5972 -6 
correctness of the amount of the refund. Hampton Bays, 14 
PERB V3018 (1981). Essential to such a review would be the 
judgment as to the proper method of calculating the "pro 
rata share". The determination of that issue must be left 
to other forums. If we were now to choose one method as 
proper, we would be interfering with a process over which we 
have no jurisdiction. 
It is the Chairman's view that until the courts 
determine that a particular formula is mandated, an employee 
organization which only uses expenditures in its calculation 
of the pro rata share should be required only to furnish 
information concerning its expenditures. We do not agree. 
We believe that in the proper administration of the statute, 
it is incumbent upon this Board to make the basic 
determination in the first instance as to the information 
that is needed. We cannot accept the Chairman's limited 
requirement because it would not reasonably assure the 
employee of an adequate basis for deciding whether an appeal 
from the organization's determination of the pro rata share 
is warranted and likely to succeed. Since on appeal, the 
objector is free to raise the question of the proper method 
of calculating the employee's pro rata share, it is 
appropriate that he be given sufficient information relevant 
to that question. The employee needs to know more than just 
the simple arithmetic process of how the employee , 
Board - U-5972 -7 
organization calculated the pro rata share. A statement of 
income and expenditures will enable him to determine 
whether, in the light of all the operations of the employee 
organization, it computed the refund on the basis of an 
inapposite formula. With that information in his 
possession, the employee will be afforded a reasonable basis 
for believing either that no further action is necessary or 
that an appeal is warranted. 
Nor do we consider it necessary or administratively wise 
to examine the particular method by which each employee 
organization makes its determination and to fashion each of 
our orders accordingly. We believe our established order 
encompasses a reasonable range of methods of calculation and 
is properly applicable to all. We perceive no unreasonable 
burden on the Local by our established order. 
Accordingly, we reject the exceptions of the Local, 
affirm the findings and conclusions of law of the hearing 
officer and adopt her remedial order. 
WE ORDER Civil Service Technical Guild. Local 375: 
1. To refund to Leon Katz the entire amount of his 
agency shop fee deduction for 1980 which it did not forward 
to its affiliates, less the sum already refunded, with 
interest at the rate of nine (9) percent per annum from 
November 21, 1981, the date of Katz' receipt of his refund 
determination. 
§870 
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2. At the time of making any other and future refunds, 
to furnish, together with those refunds, an itemized, 
audited statement of its receipts and disbursements, and 
those of any of its affiliates receiving any portion of its 
revenues from agency fees, such statement to indicate the 
basis of the determination of the amount of refund, 
including identification of those disbursements that are 
refundable and those that are not, 
3. To post a notice in the form attached, at each 
facility at which any unit personnel are employed, on 
bulletin boards to which it has access by contract, practice 
or otherwise. 
DATED: r February 11. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Mt, /c4L^^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
^ s 
nb/er David C. R a n d l e s \ Mem 
Board - U-5972 -9 
DISSENTING OPINION OF BOARD CHAIRMAN HAROLD R. NEWMAN 
The majority opinion of this Board correctly notes that 
the reason why an employee organization must provide a unit 
employee receiving an agency shop fee refund with financial 
information is that he should be able to understand the 
basis on which his refund "has been calculated and thus be 
able to determine whether an appeal is warranted and likely 
to succeed." (emphasis supplied) In the instant case the 
refund has been calculated by the Local without any 
reference to its receipts. 
Section 208.3(b) of the Taylor Law provides that an 
employee organization must refund that part of a unit 
employee's agency shop fee which represents his 
pro rata share of expenditures by the organiza-
tion in aid of activities or causes of a 
political or ideological nature only incidentally 
related to terms and conditions of employment, 
(emphasis supplied) 
Based upon its understanding of the statute, the Local 
calculated Katz' pro rata share, i.e. his refund, as 
standing in the same proportion to his total agency fee as 
the Local's political and ideological expenditures stand in 
relation to its total expenditures. As noted in the 
majority opinion, this method of calculating the amount of 
the refund is not the only possible one. Indeed, other 
employee organizations use formulas that do take into 
consideration the receipts of the organization. However, 
citing our decision in Hampton Bays, 14 PERB T3018 (1981), 
Board - U-5972 -10 
the Board majority has properly ruled that it is for the 
Courts, and not this Board, to determine whether the statute 
requires the utilization of a single formula and. if so, 
what that formula would be. 
I read our decision in Hampton Bays as requiring an 
employee organization to furnish no more than an explanation 
of the amount of the refund that it actually made. The 
Local has done so. Katz now has financial information which 
explains the amount of the refund in terms of the formula 
actually used by the employee organization and he may 
therefore consider whether to challenge the refund on the 
ground that the Local's calculations were flawed. He does 
not require any financial information from the Local in 
order to determine whether, in his judgment, it used an 
unacceptable formula in calculating the refund. He merely 
has to know what formula was used by the Local. 
Until such time as the courts determine that a 
particular formula is mandated by the statute, I believe it 
to be sufficient for an employee organization giving an 
agency shop fee refund to provide those receiving the refund 
with information setting forth the formula that it actually 
used and the financial data utilized in applying that 
formula. Where, as in some cases, the formula is based upon 
the employee organization's receipts, the information / 
concerning the amount of those receipts must be provided. 
m 
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Where, as here, the formula actually used did not include 
the employee organization's receipts, the information 
concerning those receipts need not be provided. 
The fact that, in past decisions, we have ordered other 
employee organizations to provide information about their 
receipts along with their agency shop fee refunds does not 
compel such an order here. The specific question raised by 
the exceptions before us here had not been raised and was 
not considered in those decisions. 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify a l l un i t employees t h a t : 
1. The Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, will refund to Leon Katz the 
entire amount of his agency shop fee deduction for 1980 which was not 
forwarded to its affiliates, less the sum already refunded, with interest 
at the rate of nine (9) percent, per annum from November 21, 1981. 
2. The Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, will, at the time of making 
agency shop fee refunds, furnish together with those refunds an itemized, 
audited statement of its receipts and disbursements, and those of any of 
its affiliates receiving any portion of their revenues from agency fees 
or dues, such statement to indicate the basis for the determination of 
the amount of refund, including identification of those disbursements 
of the Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, and its affiliates, that 
are refundable and those that are not. 
Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375 
Employee Organization 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL GUILD, LOCAL 375. 
Respondent, 
-and-
RAJENDRA PRASAD, 
Charging Party. 
BEVERLY GROSS, ESQ., for Respondent 
RAJENDRA PRASAD, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 30. 1982, a hearing officer determined, inter 
alia, that the Civil Service Technical Guild. Local 375 
(Local) violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act in regard to certain 
aspects of its refund procedure and the adequacy of 
financial information furnished to the charging party 
herein. As part of her remedial order the hearing officer 
directed that at the time of making future refunds the Local 
furnish, together with those refunds, "an itemized, audited 
statement of its receipts and disbursements". 
The matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Local. 
The sole issue raised by the exceptions relates to that 
portion of the hearing officer's order directing that at the 
#2E-2/ll/83 
CASE NO. U-5990 
Board - U-5990 -2 
time of making future refunds the Local must give a 
statement of receipts as well as disbursements. No other 
part of the decision or remedial order is challenged by the 
Local. The issue raised by the Local is identical to that 
raised by it in Case No. U-5972, Civil Service Technical 
Guild. Local 375 (Leon Katz) (decided concurrently herewith), 
For the reasons set forth in our decision in Case 
No. U-5972, Civil Service Technical Guild. Local 375 (Leon 
Katz) (decided concurrently herewith), we reject the 
exceptions of the Local, affirm in all respects the report 
of the hearing officer and adopt in full the remedial 
order. Therefore, 
WE ORDER Civil Service Technical Guild. Local 375: 
1. To refund to Rajendra Prasad the entire amount of 
his 1979 and 1980 agency shop fee deductions less the sum 
already refunded, with interest from the dates of receipt of 
refund determination at the rate of six (6) percent per 
annum until June 25, 1981 from which date the rate of 
interest is nine (9) percent per annum. 
2. That at the time of making any other and future 
refunds, to furnish, together with those refunds, an 
itemized, audited statement of its receipts and 
disbursements, and those of any of its affiliates receiving 
any portion of its revenues from agency fees, such statement 
to indicate the basis for the determination of the amount of 
I.XH-
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refund, including identification of those disbursements of 
the Local and its affiliates that are refundable and those 
that are not. 
3. To complete its entire refund procedure for 
applications made in subsequent years by April 2 of the year 
following the application. 
4. To post a notice in the form attached, at each 
facility at which any unit personnel aire employed, on 
bulletin boards to which it has access by contract, practice 
or otherwise. 
DATED: Albany. New York 
February 11, 1983 
/dUuuO-^^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies 
Board - U-5990 
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DISSENTING OPINION OF BOARD CHAIRMAN HAROLD R. NEWMAN 
For reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Case 
No. U-5972. Civil Service Technical Guild. Local 375 (Leon 
Katz) (decided concurrently herewith), I dissent from the 
majority opinion herein. 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
P"«<j? is 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all unit employees that: 
1. The Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, will refund to Rajendra Prasad 
the entire amount of his 1979 and 1980 agency shop fee deductions, less the 
sum already refunded, with interest from the dates.of receipt of refund 
determination, at the rate of six (6) percent per annum until June 25, 1981, 
^ from which date the rate of interest is nine (9) percent per annum. 
./ 
2. The Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, will, at the time of making 
agency shop fee refunds, furnish together with those refunds an itemized, 
audited statement of its receipts and disbursements, and those of any of 
its affiliates receiving any portion of their revenues from agency fees 
or dues, such statement to indicate the basis for the determination of 
the amount of refund, including identification of those disbursements 
of the Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, and its affiliates, that 
are refundable and those that are not. 
3. The Civil Service Technical Guild, Local 375, will complete its entire 
refund procedure for applications made in subsequent years by April 2 of 
the year following the application. 
Civil Service Technical .Guild,. Local. 3.7.5. 
Employee Organization 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2F-2/ll/83 
BUFFALO TEACHERS FEDERATION 
CASE NO. D-0138 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
MARTIN L. BARR. ESQ. (JEROME THIER. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), Charging Party 
ROBERT CLEARFIELD. ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 29. 1976, Counsel to this Board (Charging 
Party) charged the Buffalo Teachers Federation (BTF) with 
violating §210.1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by engaging in a 13-day strike against the Buffalo 
City School District (District) in September 1976. The 
hearing officer issued his decision on May 11, 1982.— In 
it he determined that BTF engaged in the strike as charged. 
but that the District engaged in such acts of extreme 
provocation as to detract from the responsibility of BTF for 
the strike. 
i^The hearing was not commenced until June 1981. This 
is because prosecution of the charge was stayed by an order 
of the United State District Court for the Southern District 
of New York. Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Helsby, 435 F. 
Supp. 1098. 10 PERB ii7015 (1S77). The stay was lifted on 
March 18. 1981, when the District Court rejected the BTF 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Act and to this 
Board's prior application of the Act. Buffalo Teachers 
Federation v. Helsbv. 515 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.. 1981). 14 
PERB T7008. aff'd 628 F. 2d 28 (2d Cir., 1982). 15 PERB 
T7009. 
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Addressing the other circumstances which, according to 
§210.3(f) of the Act. we must consider in fixing the duration of 
the forfeiture of dues deduction and agency shop fee privileges 
to be imposed upon the employee organization, the hearing officer 
made findings regarding the impact of the strike on the community 
and the impact of a penalty on BTF. He found that the failure of 
90 percent of the teachers to report to work was directly 
responsible for a substantial decline in student attendance and 
in loss of student instruction. He also determined that "the 
financial resources of BTF would be seriously strained by an 
extended loss of dues deduction and agency shop privileges [in 
that a]s of July, 1981. the BTF's Treasurer's Report projected a 
$21,725 deficit for fiscal year 1980-81." 
Charging Party has filed exceptions to the hearing officer's 
determination that the District engaged in acts of extreme 
provocation. BTF has filed no exceptions to the hearing 
officer's decision and has submitted a response to Charging 
2/ Party's exceptions.— 
2-/The Corporation Counsel of the City of Buffalo has. on 
behalf of the District, moved to intervene in this matter for the 
purpose of contesting the hearing officer's determination that 
the District engaged in acts of extreme provocation. He asserts 
that the District now seeks to "protect its own reputation." We 
deny this motion. The record shows that the Corporation Counsel 
had been given notice of the proceeding and. in fact, attended on 
both days of the hearings. However, upon the direction of the 
District, he declined invitations of the hearing officer and the 
Charging Party to participate. The District knew at the time 
when it decided not to participate that the hearing officer was 
being called upon to decide issues which might be construed to 
affect its reputation. In view of its decision not to 
participate at that time, we find no compelling reason to grant 
the District's motion, and the District has given none. 
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The hearing officer's conclusion that the District engaged 
in acts of extreme provocation is based on his finding as to the 
District's conduct: specifically, it did not give its 
negotiators authority to reach an agreement except upon the basis 
of its initial position; it refused to consider the merits of the 
BTF's demands; and it unilaterally changed the terms and 
conditions of employment of employees in BTF's negotiating unit 
upon the opening of school in September 1976 by withholding 
sabbaticals, supplemental health insurance benefits, and 
increments. He found no merit in the District's reason for 
refusing to consider the demands, that reason being that the City 
of Buffalo was concerned that any concessions made to BTF would 
lead to pressure upon the City to make comparable concessions to 
other employee organizations. 
Having read the record, we determine that it supports the 
hearing officer's conclusion that the District engaged in acts of 
extreme provocation reflecting a disposition not to negotiate in 
good faith that detracted from BTF's responsibility for the 
strike. 
The authority that the District delegated to its 
negotiators limited them to the execution of an agreement on the 
terms originally proposed by the District. The effect of that 
restriction was that the District's original proposal was put 
forth on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, thereby foreclosing any 
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opportunity for discussion or exchange of views leading to 
agreement. Further, it refused to consider the merits of 
BTF's demands. Instead, it denied them out of hand for the 
unacceptable reason of the potential impact that concessions 
by it might have on negotiations between another public 
3/ 
employer and public employees.- Having refused to allow 
genuine negotiations with BTF, the District further 
exacerbated the situation by unilaterally changing the 
existing terms and conditions of employment upon the opening 
of school. One of the changes made was the withholding of 
increments. Because at that time the employees reasonably 
expected to receive the increment, the withholding of them 
^Compare United Mine Workers v. Pennington. 381 U.S. 
657 (1965). in which the Supreme Court said: 
[T]here is nothing in the labor policy indicating 
that the union and the employers in one 
bargaining unit are free to bargain about the 
wages, hours and working conditions of other 
bargaining units . . . . On the contrary. The 
duty to bargain unit by unit leads to a quite 
different conclusion. The union's obligation to 
its members would seem best served if the union 
retained the ability to respond to each 
bargaining situation as the individual 
circumstances might warrant, without being 
strait-jacketed by some prior agreement with the 
favored employers. 
Board - D-0138 
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was a clear act of provocation.— Moreover, the 
withholding of sabbaticals and supplemental health insurance 
benefits was a flagrant disregard of the District's 
obligations to recognize and deal in good faith with the 
representative of its employees. 
Charging Party argues that we should reject BTF' s 
defense of extreme provocation because, in an action to 
enjoin the strike, a state court determined that BTF had not 
presented evidence of extreme provocation by the District. 
Board of Education v. Pisa, unreported (Sup. Ct.. Erie 
County. Sept. 27, 1976). aff'd 55 AD2d 128 (4th Dept.. 
1976). 9 PERB T7533. That determination is not res judicata 
as to the issues in the instant proceeding. Rye UFSD #4 v. 
PERB. 74 Misc. 2d 741. 6 PERB T7007 (1973). In any event. 
BTF presented additional evidence to the hearing officer 
which we find supports its claim of extreme provocation. 
In determining the duration of the forfeiture of the 
dues deduction and agency shop fee privileges of BTF, we 
must consider the past conduct of the organization. The 
record reveals that once before, in March 1970. BTF engaged 
in a strike. The Board then noted that the strike was 
limited to two of the District's ninety schools. It also 
found that there were mitigating circumstances which 
i-^ This conclusion is not affected by the subsequent 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Rockland County v. PERB. 
41 NY2d 753. 10 PERB 1[7010 (1977). that the withholding of 
increments did not constitute an illegal practice. 
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diminished BTF's responsibility for the strike. 
In view of the particular circumstances of the prior 
strike and the presence of other relevant considerations, we 
determine it appropriate to diminish the extent of the 
penalty we would normally impose for a second strike. Where 
an employee organization representing teachers engages in a 
13-day strike and has engaged in a prior strike, we would, 
absent extreme provocation, order the suspension of its dues 
deduction and agency shop fee privileges for an indefinite 
period of time of not less than 18 months. Here, however, 
there were acts of extreme provocation by the District which 
detracted from the responsibility of BTF for the 
il/see Buffalo Teachers Federation Inc.. 5 PERB ir3025 
(1972). As to one school, the mitigating circumstances were 
the failure of school administration to remedy disruption by 
pupils and parents which had already interfered with 
classroom instruction before the strike. The Board also 
noted that BTF had failed to utilize the grievance procedure 
to eliminate this condition and had instead resorted to the 
strike. Accordingly. BTF's dues checkoff rights with 
respect to employees of that school were suspended for a 
period of four months. 
The mitigating circumstances in the other school were 
greater in that there had been confrontations between unit 
employees and unauthorized outsiders whom the administration 
did not keep out of the school and that BTF had not had an 
opportunity to file a grievance at that time. Accordingly. 
BTF's dues checkoff privileges were suspended for three 
months with respect to employees at that school. 
Because of these mitigating circumstances, the fact that 
the strike was not called by BTF and that it did not spread 
throughout the school system, no penalty was assessed 
against BTF with respect to unit employees working at other 
than those two schools. 
•' m 
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strike and there is an indication of a current serious 
strain on the financial resources of BTF. Accordingly, we 
determine that BTF's dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges should be suspended for a definite period of six 
months. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the dues deduction and 
agency shop fee privileges, if any. of 
BTF be forfeited for six months 
commencing on the first practical 
date. Thereafter, no dues or agency 
shop fees shall be deducted on its 
behalf by the District until BTF 
affirms that it no longer asserts the 
right to strike against any government, 
as required by the provisions of 
§210.3(g) of the Act. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany. New York 
S%4U A%LAJ^£L~^ 
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies. Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of #2G-2/ll/83 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS/CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK. 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. U-6349 
-and-
ARNOLD M. ROTHSTEIN. 
Charging Party. 
ARNOLD M. ROTHSTEIN. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Arnold M. 
Rothstein to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his 
charge against Professional Staff Congress/City University 
of New York (PSC) on the ground that the allegations 
contained therein failed to establish a violation of the 
Taylor Law. 
Rothstein is employed by the City University of 
New York and is in a negotiating unit represented by PSC. 
He is not a member of PSC but pays an agency shop fee to it 
in accordance with an agreement reached by PSC and the City 
University pursuant to §208.2(b) of the Taylor Law. He 
charges PSC with failure to maintain an appropriate refund 
procedure as required by that statute. In support of his 
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exceptions, Rothstein argues that the Director should have 
determined that PSC's refund procedure is inadequate in that 
it does not provide information that is qualitatively 
sufficient for a person receiving a refund to decide whether 
to challenge the amount of the refund. 
In Hampton Bays Teachers Association. 14 PERB IPOIS 
(1981). we indicated (at footnote 2) that an employee 
organization must provide agency shop fee payers receiving a 
refund with the same financial information it is required to 
make available by §727 of the State's Labor Law. 
Additionally, we required it to specify the extent to which 
each of the disbursements listed in the Labor Department 
report is refundable. PSC has complied with the requirement 
set forth in Hampton Bays. The Director therefore acted 
correctly when he dismissed the charge, and we affirm his 
decision. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 11. 1983 
Albany. New York 
^ ••OU'Oo 
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CONCURRING OPINION OF BOARD CHAIRMAN HAROLD R. NEWMAN 
As I indicated in my dissenting opinion in Civil 
Service Technical Guild, Local 375 (Katz), 16 PERB ir3008 
(1983), issued today. "I read our decision in Hampton Bays 
as requiring an empi6ye^ '"'6rgan1ization_X6'"Xuxnish'""nic5""TCO"r"e" 
than an explanation of the amount of the refund that it 
actually made." PSC has done so in the instant case. 
—^7^^A< y^L^^i\\cz^. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
s 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2. AFT, AFL-CIO. 
#2H-2/ll/83 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-6262 
-and-
HARVEY M. ELENTUCK, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
On January 14, 1983, we dismissed the charge made by 
Harvey M. Elentuck against the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) on the ground that the facts as 
alleged did not constitute a violation of the Taylor Law. The 
matter comes to us once again on Elentuck's motion for 
reconsideration. The papers supporting that motion, however, 
contain no further allegations of fact and show no other basis 
for reconsideration. 
ACCORDINGLY. WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and it 
hereby is, denied. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany. New York 
L*-*S—1*CJ£I^I* 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
/Csiuxsa. 
Ida KLaus, Member 
W^/^^^Z^ 
David C. Randies. Member MU 
.^~>. o»<u*  
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the #21-2/11/83 
WESTMORELAND NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES 
SERVICE ORGANIZATION. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO 
Case No. D-0215 
Upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the application of the 
Westmoreland Non-Instructional Employees Service 
Organization. NYSUT, AFT. AFL-CIO (Organization) for 
restoration of the dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges afforded under Section 208 of the Civil Service 
Law. The Organization's privileges had been suspended 
indefinitely by an order of this Board dated July 10. 1981, 
14 PERB 1F3054. At that time we determined that the 
Organization had violated CSL §210.1 by engaging in a 29-day 
strike against the Westmoreland Central School District 
commencing on January 12, 1981. We ordered that the 
Organization's dues deduction privileges and agency shop fee 
privileges, if any, should be suspended indefinitely 
"provided that it may apply to this Board after December 
31. 1982 for the full restoration of such privileges". The 
application was to be supported by proof of good faith 
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compliance with CSL §210.1 since the violation found, and 
accompanied by an affidavit, that the Organization no longer 
asserts the right to strike, as required by CSL §210.3(g). 
The Organization has submitted an affidavit that it 
does not assert the right to strike against any government 
and we have ascertained that it has not engaged in. caused, 
instigated, encouraged or condoned a strike against the 
Westmoreland Central School District since the date of the 
above-stated violation. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the indefinite suspension 
of the dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges of the 
Westmoreland Non-Instructional Employees Service 
Organization, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO be, and it hereby is, 
terminated. 
DATED. February 11. 19 83 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Kla^s,/ Member 
1 
David C. R a n d i e s . Member 
•\j \? 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
# 2 J - 2 / l l / 8 3 
WESTERN REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION. 
Respondent, 
CASE NO• U^5 9 0 9 
-and-
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, LOCAL 222. 
Charging Party. 
MOOT & SPRAGUE. ESQS. (JOHN B. DRENNING. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
DAVIDSON. FINK. COOK & GATES, ESQS. (THOMAS A. 
FINK. ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Service 
Employees International Union, Local 222 (Local 222) to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge. The 
charge alleges that Western Regional Off-Track Betting 
Corporation (OTB) violated its duty to negotiate in good 
faith in that it assigned work that had been performed by 
branch managers to branch supervisors and. during vacation 
periods, to senior line operators or ticket machine 
operators. All three titles are in the unit represented by 
Local 222. 
8094 
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In support of its exceptions. Local 222 argues that the 
hearing officer erred in not finding that OTB refused to 
negotiate the impact of the layoffs. The charge, however, 
does not allege a refusal to negotiate the impact of 
layoffs. Moreover, if such a refusal were alleged, the 
evidence would not support the allegation. On the contrary, 
it shows that the subject was negotiated and an agreement 
reached. 
Local 222 also argues that the hearing officer erred in 
not finding that OTB violated its duty to negotiate when it 
reassigned the responsibilities of branch managers to lower 
ranking employees. The record shows, however, that the work 
of the managers which was assigned to the lower ranking 
employees had been performed by them in the past, although 
not on so regular a basis. Moreover, the parties appear to 
have reached an agreement concerning the rate of pay to be 
earned by the lower ranking employees when they perform the 
work of the managers. This is evidenced by the fact that 
Local 222 filed and won several grievances for increased 
compensation on their behalf. 
These circumstances indicate that, as found by the 
hearing officer. Local 222's charge complains that OTB has 
not fulfilled its contract obligations. The language of the 
charge itself and the manner in which Local 222 prosecuted 
its charge before the hearing officer support this 
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conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
hearing officer dismissing the charge on the ground that 
OTB's impropriety, if any, does not constitute a Taylor Law 
violation.-
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 11. 1983 
Albany. New York 
Newman, Chairman 
7t34l^<^— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
DaVid C. Rarfdles, ^ Member/ 
I/Local 222 also asserts that the hearing officer 
erred in granting OTB an opportunity to amend its answer at 
the beginning of the hearing. However, it was not a' 
violation of the Board's rules for the hearing officer to 
permit OTB to amend its answer at the opening of the hearing 
(Rule 204.3[d]). Neither was it an abuse of her discretion; 
the amendment did not prejudice Local 222. 
mi 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of #2K-2/ll/83 
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF 
AMERICA. CASE NO. D-0190 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion dated December 28. 
1982, made by Local 100. Transport Workers Union of America 
(Local 100). It moves this Board for an order remitting the 
order of this Board that was previously issued in this 
matter on October 5, 1981 (14 PERB ir3074), which directed 
the forfeiture of its dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges, if any.~ The forfeiture was imposed as a 
penalty because Local 100 engaged in an illegal 11-day 
strike against the New York City Transit Authority and the 
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Operating Authority from April 1 
through April 11. 1980.-f 
i^The forfeiture did not commence until one year later 
because a temporary stay was not dissolved by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals until September 20. 1982. Lawe v. Newman, 689 F2d 
378 (2d Cir. 1982). 15 PERB T7021. 
i/Our order provided that the dues deduction and 
agency shop fee privileges, if any. of Local 100 be 
forfeited for a period of 18 months and that thereafter no 
dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf 
until Local 100 affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government. 
'•~~ \jf\it* 
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In our 1981 decision, we noted that: 
[T]he impact of the forfeiture penalty may require 
reconsideration of that penalty if. after having 
made an effort to do so by reasonable available 
alternative methods, an employee organization is 
not able to collect sufficient dues to insure 
proper representation of unit employees, (at 
p. 3132. fn. 8) 
It is upon this language that Local 100 now relies. The 
basis of Local 100's motion is that the forfeiture has 
threatened its solvency thereby rendering it incapable of 
providing necessary services to unit employees. 
In support of its motion. Local 100 has submitted 
evidence that its staff is contacting its members 
individually and engaging in the hand collection of dues. 
It has also written to its 33,000 active members urging them 
to pay their dues by mail or to cooperate with the staff 
personnel collecting dues. Notwithstanding these efforts, 
however, its financial statement shows that during the 
ten-week period between October 9, 1982 and December 11. 
1982. its dues collection amounted to $557,656.83. This 
compares to $990,000.00 it collects from its 33,000 members 
during a normal ten-week period. This amounts to a 44% 
falloff in its normal dues income. In part, this may be 
explained by Local 100's difficult task of having to collect 
dues from members working at more than 700 different 
locations, many of which are serviced by several shifts 
covering 24 hours a day. 
Board - D-0190 -3 
Local 100's statement also shows increased monthly 
expenses directly related to its dues collection efforts 
3/ 
amounting to 11% of its normal income.- Thus, Local 100 
has sustained a 55% burden by reason of its loss of checkoff 
. .. 4/ privileges.-
The ability of Local 100 to provide representational 
services to its negotiating unit has been severely impaired 
by its loss of income and, even more so, by its need to use 
its staff in dues collection efforts to the detriment of 
their normal representational duties. At present, for those 
unit employees working for the Transit Authority, there is a 
backlog of 1,450 step 5 grievances, 75 step 4 grievances and 
300 disciplinary cases. This compares with the total 
•^ /in calculating this amount, we added one eighteenth 
of the startup costs (corresponding to the 18-month period 
of the forfeiture) to the amount of the ongoing monthly 
costs, and we divided that sum by the normal monthly dues 
income of Local 100. 
-/In United Federation of Teachers. 15 PERB 1P091 
(1982), we suspended the forfeiture of the dues deduction 
privileges of the United Federation of Teachers because the 
financial losses it was suffering threatened its solvency 
and impaired its ability to provide representational 
services to the public employees whom it represented. UFT's 
loss of income was only 29% but its collection costs 
amounted to 18% of normal income. Thus, it suffered an 
aggregate burden amounting to 47% of its normal income. The 
consequent impact of this loss upon its ability to represent 
unit employees, as detailed in that decision, was less 
severe than the impact upon Local 100. 
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backlog of 50 cases of all kinds one year ago. Similarly, 
for those unit employees working for Division 2 of the 
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Operating Authority, there is a 
current backlog of 225 cases instead of the 35 case backlog 
last year.— 
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that, by 
reason of its loss of dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges, the ability of Local 100 to provide necessary 
material services to unit employees has been and continues 
to be severely impaired.- This justifies reconsideration 
of our order of October 5. 1981, and a suspension of that 
penalty.— 
^The data for the Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
Operating Authority. Division 1. was presented in a 
different form. It shows the increased time taken to 
process cases rather than the increased backlog. The time 
taken to process a case has more than doubled. 
•^Writing on behalf of the Transit Authority and the 
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Operating Authority, the 
Chairman of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority has 
confirmed that Local 100's ability to administer its 
contract and handle grievances in an expeditious manner has 
been impaired. He has encouraged us to grant the motion 
herein. 
2/we note that Local 100 has affirmed that it no 
longer asserts a right to strike against any government, to 
assist or participate in such strike, or to impose an 
obligation to conduct, assist or participate in such a 
strike. 
8100 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE MODIFY our order to the extent that 
the forfeiture of the dues deduction 
and agency shop fee privileges, if any. 
of Local 100 be suspended; that such 
suspension is subject to revocation in 
the event of a strike or strike 
threat. Local 100 may apply to this 
Board, on notice to the New York 
Transit Authority and the Manhattan and 
Bronx Surface Operating Authority, in 
April 1984 for full restoration of its 
dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany. New York 
Harqiid R. Newman. Chairman 
f/~-Ms(4^^ 
David C. RandlesX, Membe, 
VJ"» 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#2L-2/ll/83 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION. AFL-CIO, 
LOCAL 726. CASE NO. D-0191 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion dated February 2, 
1983, made by the Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO. Local 
726 (Local 726). It moves this Board for an order remitting 
the order of this Board that was previously issued in this 
matter on October 5. 1981 (14 PERB ir3074). which directed 
the forfeiture of its dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges, if any. The forfeiture was imposed as a penalty 
because Local 726 engaged in an illegal 11-day strike 
against the New York City Transit Authority— from April 1 
2/ 
through April 11, 1980.-
•i/The New York City Transit Authority has taken no 
position with respect to the motion. 
'^'our order provided that the dues deduction and 
agency shop fee privileges, if any. of Local 726 be 
forfeited for a period of 18 months and that thereafter no 
dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf 
until Local 726 affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government as provided by §210.3(g) of 
the Taylor Law. 
1 
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In our 1981 decision, we noted that: 
[T]he impact of the forfeiture penalty may require 
reconsideration of that penalty if, after having 
made an effort to do so by reasonable available 
alternative methods, an employee organization is 
not able to collect sufficient dues to insure 
proper representation of unit employees, (at p. 
3132. fn. 8) 
It is upon this language that Local 726 now relies. The 
basis of Local 726's motion is that the forfeiture has 
threatened its solvency thereby rendering it incapable of 
providing necessary services to unit employees. 
In support of its motion. Local 726 has submitted 
evidence that it has urged its members to prepay their dues 
or to have their dues paid on their behalf by a credit 
3/ 
union.- It has also hired two additional employees to 
assist in its collection efforts. Notwithstanding these 
efforts, however, its financial statement shows that it 
sustained a 36% falloff in its income in the period between 
4/ October 4. 1982— and January 2. 1983, as compared with 
the period from July 3. 1982 to September 25. 1982. 
3/it. notes that the Transit Authority has objected to 
this procedure on the ground that it is a circumvention of 
the Taylor Law penalty. To the same effect, see the opinion 
of Counsel to this Board at 6 PERB 1f5002 (January 17. 1973). 
i/The forfeiture did not commence until then because a 
temporary stay was not dissolved by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals until September 20, 1982, Lawe v. Newman. 689 F2d 
378 (2d Cir. 1982). 15 PERB ir7021. 
) 
mm 
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Its statement does not show the amount of its increased 
monthly expenses directly related to its dues collection 
efforts. 
Local 726 has not shown that its ability to provide 
representational services to its negotiating unit has been 
impaired by its loss of dues checkoff privileges. While it 
has shown a loss of income and a depletion of its resources, 
its papers merely allege that its ability to provide 
representational services in the future will be impaired if 
it does not recover its dues deduction privileges soon. 
That allegation is not a sufficient basis for the motion 
herein. Relief from a dues checkoff forfeiture is only 
granted when the effect of that forfeiture is an actual, 
rather than a prospective, impairment of the employee 
organization's ability to provide representational 
5/ 
services.- . 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and 
it hereby is. DENIED. 
DATED: February 11. 19 83 
Albany. New York 
^Compare United Federation of Teachers. 14 PERB 1f3073 
(1981). 
Haroltf'TR ./Newman, chairman 
David C. Randies. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e Mat ter of #2M-2/ll/83 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION. AFL-CIO. 
LOCAL 1056, CASE NO. D-0192 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on a motion dated January 7. 
1983, made by the Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO. Local 
1056 (Local 1056). It moves this Board for an order 
remitting the order of this Board that was previously issued 
in this matter on October 5, 1981 (14 PERB ir3074), which 
directed the forfeiture of its dues deduction and agency 
shop fee privileges, if any. The forfeiture was imposed as 
a penalty because Local 1056 engaged in an illegal 11-day 
strike against the New York City Transit Authority— from 
April 1 through April 11. 1980.-f 
I/The New York City Transit Authority has taken no 
position with respect to the motion. 
l/Our order provided that the dues deduction and 
agency shop fee privileges, if any, of Local 1056 be 
forfeited for a period of 18 months and that thereafter no 
dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf 
until Local 1056 affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government as provided by §210.3(g) of 
the Taylor Law. 
\M* 
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In our 1981 decision, we noted that: 
[T]he impact of the forfeiture penalty may require 
reconsideration of that penalty if, after having 
made an effort to do so by reasonable available 
alternative methods, an employee organization is 
not able to collect sufficient dues to insure 
proper representation of unit employees, (at 
p. 3132. fn. 8) 
It is upon this language that Local 1056 now relies. The 
basis of Local 1056's motion is that the forfeiture has 
threatened its solvency thereby rendering it incapable of 
providing necessary services to unit employees. 
In support of its motion. Local 1056 has submitted 
evidence that its officers are contacting its members 
individually and engaging in the hand collection of dues. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, however, its financial 
statement shows that it sustained a 42% falloff in its 
income in the period between October 5. 1982, the date on 
3/ 
which the forfeiture commenced,— and January 7. 1983, the 
date of the motion herein, as compared with the prior 
13-week period. Its statement also shows increased monthly 
expenses directly related to its dues collection efforts 
3/The forfeiture did not commence until then because a 
temporary stay was not dissolved by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals until September 20, 1982. Lawe v. Newman. 689 F2d 
378 (2d Cir. 1982). 15 PERB T7021. 
WO 
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amounting to 5% of its normal income. Thus. Local 1056 has 
sustained a 47% burden by reason of its loss of checkoff 
. ... 4/ privileges.— 
The ability of Local 1056 to provide representational 
services to its negotiating unit has been severely impaired 
by its loss of income and even more so, by its need to use 
its officers in dues collection efforts almost to the 
exclusion of their normal representational duties. Whereas 
the local normally handles between seven and ten step 5 
grievance hearings each month dealing with differential pay 
and sick leave, it has handled none in December 1982, none 
in January 1983 and none is scheduled for February 1983. 
Similarly, where it would have ordinarily taken at least 
five regular grievances to arbitration each month, it has 
taken none since its loss of dues checkoff privileges 
because its leadership is preoccupied with dues collection. 
For the same reason. Local 1056 has been unable to provide 
4/In United Federation of Teachers. 15 PERB V3091 
(1982). we suspended the forfeiture of the dues deduction 
privileges of the United Federation of Teachers because the 
financial losses it was suffering threatened its solvency 
and impaired its ability to provide representational 
services to the public employees whom it represented. UFT's 
loss of income was only 29% but its collection costs 
amounted to 18% of normal income. Thus, it too suffered an 
aggregate burden amounting to 47% of its normal income. The 
consequent impact of this loss upon its ability to represent 
unit employees, as detailed in that decision, was less 
severe than the impact upon Local 1056. 
Board - D-0192 -4 
normal representational services to employees facing 
disciplinary hearings. 
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that, by 
reason of its loss of dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges, the ability of Local 1056 to provide necessary 
material services to unit employees has been and continues 
to be severely impaired. This justifies reconsideration of 
our order of October 5, 1981. and a suspension of that 
penalty.-
NOW. THEREFORE. WE MODIFY our order to the extent that 
the forfeiture of the dues deduction 
and agency shop fee privileges, if any. 
of Local 1056 be suspended; that such 
suspension is subject to revocation in 
the event of a strike or strike 
threat. Local 1056 may apply to this 
Board, on notice to the New York 
Transit Authority, in April 1984 for 
^/We note that Local 1056 has affirmed that it no 
longer asserts a right to strike against any government, to 
assist or participate in such strike, or to impose an 
obligation to conduct, assist or participate in such a 
strike. 
*
,
.«&'^  
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full restoration of its dues and agency 
shop fee deduction privileges. 
DATED: February 11. 19 83 
Albany. New York 
Newman. Chairman 
David C. Randies. Memb 
-- VJUfc\i» 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2N-2/ll/83 
WASHINGTONVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. CASE NO. E-0828 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. (ERNEST R. STOLZER, ESQ. and 
FREDERICK D. BRAID. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Petitioner 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (DONA S. BULLUCK. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Washingtonville Central School District (District) 
filed the application herein for the designation of four of its 
clerical employees as confidential within the meaning of 
§201.7(a) of the Taylor Law. It was opposed by Orange County 
Local 836, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.. AFL-CIO, 
(CSEA) which represents the four positions. After a hearing, 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) determined that two of the positions, that of Sandy 
Gauquie. part-time secretary to the Superintendent, and Edna 
Weinheim. bookkeeper, are confidential and two. that of Roslyn 
Himelson. payroll clerk, and Polly Mogge. part-time account 
clerk/typist, are not. This matter now comes to this Board on 
.; too 
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the exceptions of the District to the Director's determination 
that Himelson and Mogge are not confidential employees.— 
Himelson and Mogge maintain the payroll and attendance 
records of the District and there is no showing that anything in 
these recoxds isconfidential. From time to time, Himelson and 
Mogge are asked to compile statistical information from the 
records they maintain, such as attendance data concerning 
provisional teachers who are being considered for tenure and the 
leave time taken by teachers to work on negotiations and 
grievances. By way of contrast, Weinheim, whom he determined to 
be confidential, prepares analyses of alternative negotiation 
proposals which the District is considering but has not yet 
placed. As such, she is privy to information to which CSEA has 
no right. 
The Director properly determined that the assignments of 
Himelson and Mogge do not justify their designation as 
confidential. 
An alternative basis of the District's application is that 
Himelson and Mogge work in the same room as Weinheim and, 
perforce, are exposed to confidential information. Mogge. 
I/No exceptions were filed to that part of the Director's 
decision holding that Gauquie and Weinheim are confidential. 
m 
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moreover, performs Weinheint's work when she is absent. The 
record does not show, however, that Himelson and Mogge cannot 
reasonably be insulated from exposure to the occasional 
confidential work performed by Weinheim. Without such a 
showing, Himelson and Mogge cannot be deprived of;_. theright of 
representation which the law has given to them. The record also 
does not show that Mogge has ever worked on confidential 
material in place of Weinheim. Her substitution for Weinheim, 
too, is therefore no basis for designating her confidential. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the exceptions of the 
District be. and they hereby are, DISMISSED. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany. New York 
-rf&^^/^sb^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
3*1* SdZu^^L--
David C. Randies. 
,-. <j&Jl.h*> 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK. DIVISION OF 
MILITARY AND NAVAL AFFAIRS. 
Employer. 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ. (WILLIAM F. COLLINS. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Employer 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS. (PAULINE ROGERS 
KINSELLA, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On March 22. 1982. the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000, AFSCME. AFL-CIO (CSEA) filed 
a petition seeking certification as the negotiating 
representative of a unit of all employees of the Division of 
Military and Naval Affairs (DMNA) of the State of New York 
(State) except members of the organized militia as defined 
by §2.1 of the State Military Law.— The State opposed 
•I/Military Law §2.1 provides: The organized militia 
shall be composed of the New York army national guard; the 
New York air national guard; the inactive national guard; 
the New York naval militia; the New York guard whenever such 
a state force shall be duly organized and such additional 
forces as may be created by the governor. 
.- 8113 
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the petition, arguing that DMNA employees were not entitled 
2/ 
to representation under the Taylor Law.— The matter has 
come to us on the exceptions of the State to the 
determination of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) rejecting the State's argument. 
Section 203 of the Taylor Law provides that public 
employees have a right to representation. The term "public 
employee" is defined by §201.7(a) of the Law. Subject to 
specified exceptions, it means "any person holding a 
position by appointment or employment in the service of a 
public employer . . . ." Section 201.6(a) of the Law 
defines the term "public employer" to mean, among other 
entities, the State of New York. DMNA is a division of the 
Executive Department of the State of New York and its 
employees are therefore employees of the State. 
Accordingly, they are entitled to representation under the 
Taylor Law unless excluded by §201.7(a) of the Law. 
^This contention did not extend to civilian employees 
of DMNA who perform civil defense functions. Unlike other 
employees of DMNA, they are in the civil service of the 
State. Depending upon their occupations, they are presently 
included in the Administrative unit, in the Operational unit 
or in the Professional, Scientific and Technical unit of 
State employees. 
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The relevant language of that section excludes "persons 
holding positions by appointment or employment in the 
organized militia of the state . . . ." Thus, the question 
before us is whether a reasonable distinction may be made 
between the employees of DMNA and the organized militia. 
That distinction is clearly specified in §1.6 of the 
Military Law which particularizes more than one kind of 
military service. It provides: 
The term "military service of the state" as to 
military personnel shall mean service in or with 
a force of the organized militia or in the 
division of military and naval affairs of the 
executive department of the state. 
Notwithstanding the clear distinction made by the 
Military Law between service in or with a force of the 
organized militia and service in DMNA, the State asserts 
that the Taylor Law exclusion which refers to the organized 
militia must be read to exclude DMNA employees as well. In 
doing so it relies upon the fact that civilian employees of 
DMNA are in the military rather than the civil service of 
the State; upon a letter written by this Board's Counsel on 
March 13. 1968. giving his opinion that the Taylor Law does 
3/ 
not cover employees of DMNA— ; and upon claimed 
I / S e e 1 PERB 1f523 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
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legislative intention to deny Taylor Law coverage to all 
employees of DMNA. 
We do not find the position of the State to be 
persuasive. Coverage under the Taylor Law is not restricted 
to employees in the civil service of the State. It extends 
to all employees of the State, unless otherwise excluded, 
regardless of whether they are in the civil service. The 
Director has correctly noted that the Taylor Law has covered 
persons employed pursuant to provisions of the Federal 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act and civilian 
deputies employed by a county sheriff, even though they were 
4/ 
not civil service employees.— 
As noted in its last paragraph, the 1968 opinion of 
this Board's Counsel was but an advisory opinion because 
authoritative determinations may only be made by this Board 
in actual cases presented to it. Nevertheless, that opinion 
appears to have misled CSEA, causing it to support the 
introduction of several bills designed to specify that only 
"military positions" be excluded from Taylor Law coverage. 
None of those bills was reported from the committees of 
either the Senate or the Assembly to which they were 
i/see also McCoy V. Helsbv. 34 AD2d 252 (3d Dept., 
1970). 3 PERB ir7007. aff'd 28 NY2d 290 (1971). 4 PERB T7007. 
in which the courts held that employees of the judiciary 
were covered by the Taylor Law even though they were not 
otherwise covered by the Civil Service Law. 
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assigned. The State argues that this demonstates a 
legislative intention that the civilian employees of DMNA 
should not enjoy representation rights under the Taylor Law. 
We do not reach that conclusion. In the face of the 
explicit language of §201.7(a) of the Taylor Law and the 
applicable provisions of the Military Law, it would be wrong 
to place so heavy a reliance upon the mere failure of two 
legislative committees to act upon bills before them. Their 
inaction is ambiguous at best. The committee members may 
have concluded, as we do now, that civilian employees of 
DMNA were already covered by the Taylor Law and that the 
proposed amendment was therefore redundant. 
In another aspect of its legislative history argument, 
the State relies upon separate and unrelated employee 
benefit bills which it prepared. Those bills sometimes 
refer to employees of DMNA as being employees "excluded from 
negotiation rights." However, the reference itself is not 
clear as the bills also, at times, refer to them as 
employees "excluded from collective bargaining units". It 
would therefore not be unreasonable to conclude that, to the 
extent that it gave any thought to the matter at all, the 
Legislature considered the two references to be synonymous 
for the purposes of those particular bills. We find no 
sufficient basis in the sources cited by the State for 
concluding that the Legislature intended to deny Taylor Law 
coverage to DMNA employees. The intent of the Legislature 
Board - C-2437 -( 
is more clearly reflected in the provisions of the Taylor 
Law and the Military Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director. 
and 
WE REMAND the matter to him for further 
proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany. New York 
fcSg^L 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
c ^ u Si&U 4^4* 
Ida Klaus,. Member 
David C. Randies . MemKer 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NORWICH. 
-and-
Employer. 
LOCAL 1 8 2 . INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS. 
Petitioner. 
#3A-2/ll/83 
CASE NO. C-2505 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding, having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Building Inspector III; Assistant 
City Engineer; Typist. Small Cities 
Program; Clerk. Police Department; 
Clerk, Water Department; Clerk, 
Chamberlain's Office 
Excluded: Deputy City Chamberlain/Clerk and QHtii 
all other employees. oJ-.iL 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances. 
DATED: February 11, 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
<S^-<L^ KJ2^*<^<L — 
Ida Klaus, Member 
wJ^k. 
David C. Randies, Member 
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